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INTERVIEW WITH CHRISTOPH MÖLLERS: ON THE POSSIBILITIES
AND AFACTICITY OF NORMS

INTRODUCTION

Christoph Möllers, Professor of Public Law and Jurisprudence at the
Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, discussed his recent book, The Possibility of
Norms,1 and related concepts of jurisprudence on June 16, 2016 with Alex
Holznienkemper, Ph.D. of Baylor University. The following is an edited
transcript of their interview as translated by Dr. Holznienkemper.

Q: Prof. Möllers, since 2009 you have been the Professor for Public Law at
the Humboldt University of Berlin, and you have just recently published
your most comprehensive, and possibly most ambitious, book, The Possibility
of Norms, in the fall of 2015. In your own words, would you mind providing
a concise overview of the concerns of the book?
The book is driven by three concerns. The first concern stems from the
recognition that we face a highly fractious discourse, which often talks about
norms in general but ends up merely concerned with a subdiscipline’s own
norms—legal, theological, aesthetic, or other social norms. And yet, we employ
the term “norm” uniformly. There is a need for a discursive coherency in which
this uniformity is accounted for—where the common conception of norms is
upheld. A second concern can be found in the idea that this commonality is
unlikely to be found in moral philosophy; the terms of which are quite dominant
in all disciplines. To me, this appears to severely inhibit cognition in discourse as
a whole. A third and final concern was to put forward the idea that we should not
think about norms merely in terms of limitations and restrictions, but rather in
categories of enabling and facilitating. After all, norms are means with which we
can do things that we otherwise would not be able to do.
Q: Before we get to questions about the book, and your work more generally,
could you offer some reflections on your everyday work? Aside from your
position as professor at Humboldt Universität’s law school, you are also an
active participant working towards outlawing the Nationaldemokratische
Partei Deutschlands (Germany’s far right political party). How has such
practical, hands-on work shaped your research and teaching
responsibilities?
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In Germany, jurisprudence has always been closely linked to practice. I have
served as judge in numerous constitutional proceedings, and I took on a
secondary appointment as a judge for four years. This entailed having a say as
professorial judge as a senate member. When you delve into legal practice, you
certainly gain a more lucid impression of the multitude of pragmatic phenomena,
of how careful you have to be in trying to make them more uniform, and how
carefully you need to find a conceptual vocabulary that can conform to norms and
yet avoid reducing or visiting violence upon such phenomena.
Q: In this coming academic year, you will serve as Bok Visiting International
Professor at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. What do you
envision from this time in the United States, and are there current issues in
the American context of particular interest to you? What experiences have
you already had in the United States?
On the whole, I find the United States to be a stimulating source of intellectual
curiosity. I spent a year in Chicago, which turned out to be one of the most
enticing years of my life. In the 1990s, the constitutional debate in the United
States was particularly rich—maybe more so than it currently is. Back then, I
was interested in behavioral law and economics and was working with [Cass R.]
Sunstein, who taught there. As things stand now, I do not have a very specific
field of inquiry during my visits. I want to revisit some specific debates, but I
generally appreciate how the United States currently has an academic culture in
which each person writes his or her own book and pursues his or her own
interests, and that the discussion actually is not totally homogenized. You simply
happen upon stimulating new lines of inquiry.
Q: On the German theory blog, www.theorieblog.de, you mentioned in a
discussion of your book that it was a “leftover product” of an unwritten
theory of law.2 Could you explain the genesis of the book project? What was
the general impetus for it? And who is the envisioned audience for the book?
In German bookstores, it can be found prominently displayed in the
philosophy sections, but it is hard to imagine stumbling upon it at a Barnes
and Noble in the United States. Is this a specifically German or European
discourse, or might the book have a wider audience in mind?
The book has a rather unique genesis. At first, I wanted to write a discourse
comparison between German legal and literary theory of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, spanning the time period between Early Romanticism and
National Socialism. In that process, I got stuck in problems of legal theory and
began writing a second book on a theory of law. There, too, I got caught up in the
concept of normativity and the question of what it actually means for a legal norm
to be a norm. It seemed to me that it was necessary to compare those [legal]
2
Cristoph Möllers, Möllers-Buchforum (5): Die (Un-)Möglichkeit der Normen—Replik des Autors
[Möllers Book Forum (5): The (Im)possibility of Norms—Author’s Reply], THEORIEBLOG (Dec. 21, 2015),
http://www.theorieblog.de/index.php/2015/12/moellers-buchforum-5-die-un-moeglichkeit-der-normenreplik-des-autors/.
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norms with other forms of norms in order to get to the bottom of it. That is how I
ultimately ended up on a third project—the one that led to this book publication.
Around 2008, I was stuck in a little bit of a crisis, as I was not quite sure how to
[continue]. So, I simply opted for what seemed to be the most challenging—and
abstract—and ended up finishing this book. The German audience is certainly a
more intellectually open one; for that reason you will find such books in public
interest bookstores here. On the other hand, the potential audience is an academic
one—particularly in the social sciences, literary criticism, aesthetics, and, also,
legal theory—but that is less immediate.
Q: Was it your intention to make the title ambiguous? On first impression,
one might think the book is concerned with exploring the conditions of
possibility for norms. But it is also about the realm of possibilities opened up
by norms, right? Or do they both play a role?
Indeed, the book’s title encompasses three meanings. The first meaning is that
norms are a social possibility. At least theoretically, one could imagine social
orders that could manage without or with few norms—that is, such a society
would not perceive the possibility of norms. Secondly, norms are enabling in the
sense that they are not merely constricting, but make possible certain practices
that would otherwise not exist without norms. And the third meaning concerns
the conditions of possibility of norms—that is, the social conditions in which one
can more or less successfully implement normative practices.
Q: The central claim of your work is: “Norms are to be understood as
positively marked possibilities. Norms point towards a possible condition or
a possible event. The positive marking indicates that this possibility is to be
realized.”3 I myself found the term “positive marking” to be slightly
unwieldy. Certainly, you chose this terminology very carefully—why not
resort to terms such as “affirmation,” “consensus,” or “agreement”?
Ultimately, my concern was with employing a term that is clean, that does not
carry too many connotations with it—one that does not piggyback off of an entire
moral philosophical tradition. After all, a fundamental function of the term is to
sideline the question of the norm’s justification, and I do not want to claim that
only reasons or preferences account for the generation of a norm. Towards that
end, I may have inconsistently availed myself of too many open terms, such as
“prostance,” “affirmation,” or “marking.” This is because I believe that they
carry the least amount of conceptual baggage and help sideline all the metaethical debates that are concerned with the nature of what makes a norm a norm.
Considering that norms operate and are accounted for very differently in social
practice, I purposefully did not want to presumptively answer the philosophical
question of norm justification in this context.

3

MÖLLERS, supra note 1, at 13–14.

4

NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L.

vol. 7:1

It is crucial to distinguish two levels of affirmation. At the conceptual-analytical
level, we are concerned with a two-tiered conception of norms. We have a
possibility, and the realization of this possibility is affirmed. On the practical
level, it is important to recognize that this affirmation—this “marking,” as I call
it—needs to be made explicit. We need to see that norms are disclosed as norms;
otherwise, they cannot operate in practice. This also hinges on the problem of
depiction and representation. In any case, we can observe that communicating
with norms is not self-evident, but rather that norms need to be explicitly
formulated as norms.
Q: We are circling around some of Rainer Forst’s critique of your book.4
Could you briefly summarize the opposing viewpoint from Prof. Forst? How
does he believe to solve the problem of norm justification?
Prof. Forst wrote a critique of the book that is indebted to his own theoretical
background. He comes from the critical theory tradition and was a student of
Jürgen Habermas marked by a more analytical vantage point—a more Kantian
approach to the justification of norms. Prof. Forst’s contention would claim that
we cannot avoid talking about norms other than by referring to their justification;
any differentiation between norm and justification would miss the mark of this
phenomenon. On this account, my approach in talking about norms in a nonjustified, non-normative manner would be conceptually misdirected. That is not
apparent to me. I would argue that such a premise entails many problems. There
is really no way to circumvent making distinctions between norms whose
justification has been successful and those whose justification has failed. If one
tries to avoid this, one has to take a stance in which certain norms are held to be
real norms and others to be merely force-fed or presumptive. As a result, in
describing social phenomena, one ends up normatively shaping these phenomena
by either supporting them or critiquing them. To me—as much as I also do not
believe in such a value-free paradigm—that seems to be a greater obstacle. On
top of that, I see that when we take a look at how we cope with norms in social
practice, we can clearly see that both compliance and violations of norms occur
for completely different reasons—and, at times, for conflicting reasons. That
means that we can coalesce around certain norms, but that the justifications for
these norms often are not shared. The justification does not get discussed, it
remains open—it can be contradictorily filled in or simply concealed. If we take
such phenomena seriously, then it is crucial to differentiate between a norm and
its justification. You do not always have to separate them. You can also concede
to the norm a space in the social structure, but the justification does have to at
least be conceptually isolated; otherwise, one departs from the analytical
framework.
Q: Following up on that, is this a philosophical problem, or are we faced with
a purely linguistic problem? Does the problem of justification hinge on the
4
Rainer Forst, Wie utopisch sind Tischsitten? [How utopian are table manners?], DIE ZEIT, Jan. 28,
2016, http://www.zeit.de/2016/03/die-moeglichkeit-der-normen-christop-moellers.
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limits of our language? Here, I am reminded of the dispute between Jürgen
Habermas and Charles Taylor concerning the viability and requirements of
consensus in public discourse. Does Prof. Forst not acknowledge the
necessarily incomplete task of normative practices?
With my background in jurisprudence, it is interesting for me to see what Taylor
criticizes about Habermas: that Habermas insinuates a moral language which is
incompletely typified in natural language since these natural languages are
incapable of fully implementing or depicting the necessary rationality demands. I
am interested in an analogous argument with respect to institutions. We should
not try to first construct a philosophy of the morally right and then institutionally
implement it. But we rather need to make clear from the outset that no norm can
exist outside of its particular institutionalization and that social norms only ever
appear under the cloak of institutional practices. We cannot think away the one
from the other. If we were to do that, we would end up with a reconstruction that
entails the ideal on one side and the friction on the other—with the friction
becoming problematic both in the theory of language and in institutional theory.
On my view, however, it is precisely this social practice marked as friction that
enables normative practices and linguistic communication in the first place. We
should not view it as a problematic side effect or accident of the actual justifying
substance. We need to invert that relationship.
Q: Concentrating on action does seem to have one advantage: it is tangible.
To what degree do you think it is necessary to move away from actioncentered thought and to put a renewed focus on identity?
For me, it is important that norms do not necessarily operate in action. That
stems primarily from my self-understanding within the legal tradition. There, we
observe that actions are not something self-evident. On the contrary, particularly
in criminal law, we need to expend great conceptual effort in order to define what
constitutes an action. We need to distinguish between preparation—processes
that were unintentional—and processes in which an agent did not have control
over the outcomes because he or she was drunk or caught in organizational webs
in which they participated in a given action, wherein the participation itself did
not bring about the overall action or outcome of a presumed action. That is to
say, actions do not constitute a basic unit in my understanding. Actions are
themselves the result of normative practices which reward or sanction actions
and, concomitantly, must define what exactly constitutes an action. This is
viewed quite differently in the Anglo-Saxon tradition, and numerous lines of
thought overlap there that may actually be less related to each other than
commonly held. The analytical theory of action itself—which arises from
theoretical philosophy and less so from pragmatics, but has seeped into pragmatic
philosophy; a problem itself because a methodological individualism transforms
into a normative individualism without any proper justification—merges with a
very strong liberal, libertarian understanding in which a responsible or culpable
agent must always be identified. Ultimately, we observe how the insight that
social processes continue to operate without being able to assign culpability is not
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particularly widespread in popular discourse. I, on the other hand, would think
that we need to reverse that thought process and recognize that actions are indeed
a central unit of normative practices in a world saturated with rights, but not an
elementary unit. Rather, actions are also constituted, and, quite to the contrary,
we have many normative practices that refer to things such as collective identity,
individual identity, or to being someone as opposed to doing something. [Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich] Hegel’s dictum “be a person”5 is nothing else than an appeal
to become someone who is capable of carrying out actions.
Q: Assuming we concede to this idea, what is the next step? Do we find a
“better” basic unit? What alternatives are there: being, thought, or world
condition?
My solution to the problem of which general term to use consisted in working on
the notion of possibilities. We insinuate possible conditions in normative
practices and we do not limit ourselves to employing actions or identities as
objects of norms. If I designate all that with the category of possibilities, then I
have a sufficiently abstract category that also improves my ability to grasp
differences and historical developments more accurately while also not reducing
the plethora of normative practices too narrowly to certain models.
Q: One of the great strengths of the book is its breadth of applications to
numerous disciplines. Your intermezzo on normativity and aesthetics stands
out in particular. To what degree do you ascribe a constitutive role to art
and literature in conceptualizing and imagining normativity?
In the book, there were really two strains of thought that really intrigued me
regarding art and art aesthetics—and their relationship certainly merits deeper
reflection. On the one hand, we have the question of whether art is actually a
normative project. We have a rather powerful tradition that says “no, art is
inconsequential”; not in the sense that nothing happens in art, but in the sense that
art pursues no precise normative claims. Art has become autonomous, which
entails a differentiation between art and social normative claims. And yet, art is
invested with lots of hope and numerous expectations. Art is seen as highly
desirable. How can this be reconciled with the autonomy of art? This is the first
question of major concern. The second, and quite different, question concerns the
degree to which we can gain insights from the theory of art for the pragmatic
representation of norms. This has to do with the fact that there is a specific
commonality between art and norms—namely, their “afacticity.” That is, the fact
that [norms] precisely cannot be reduced to a status quo—to a reality—but that
they strive to open up alternative worlds. In such afactual worlds, the fact that we
are caught up in a certain condition of the world is only of secondary interest.
This cannot disprove or nullify the norm at hand and also cannot undermine the

5
GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, NATURRECHT UND STAATSWISSENSCHAFTEN IN GRUNDRISSE;
GRUNDLINIEN DER PHILOSOPHIE DES RECHTS ¶ 36 [NATURAL LAW AND THE SCIENCE OF THE STATE;
ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT] (1821).
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claims of aesthetic depiction. Quite to the contrary, aesthetic theory has much to
say about how to cope with this problem. It has theories of fiction. It has a very
sophisticated, if rather complex, ontology in which differentiations are drawn
between various forms of art. But it accounts for the chain that begins with
notation and leads to performance in numerous art forms. All of this is of great
importance for norms, as well, and aesthetic theory is well suited to ask how that
works—whereas legal theory largely neglects the representational aspect.
Q: Early on in the book you state, “many practical problems center on the
question of representability.”6 Could one generally claim that one of the
central challenges for normative discourse is its aesthetic representation? Is
aesthetic representation often sidelined under the guise of a presumably
neutral language? Can we also consider the more practical side of art as
having a constitutive effect on social theory?
Since norms refer to afactual worlds, their representation is subject to particular
difficulties. Norms are not fictions; they also are not untrue, but they also are not
real in the same sense that facts are. Notably, norms can be broken without this
affecting the status of the norm. But how are we to depict a norm in light of a
social practice that permanently deviates from that very norm? Towards that end,
we need mechanisms of envisioning and recalling—mechanisms that do not
simply leave the content of the norm untouched, but cannot be separated from it.
In answering the question of how this can be achieved, aesthetic categories can
help.
Q: To what degree can literary criticism yield insights into originalism and
functionalism in constitutional law? Originalism is a topic that has
reemerged in the United States after Justice Antonin Scalia’s death. In
literary criticism, talk of originalism is a bit of a taboo, so how might a
comparison between literary artefacts and constitutions be helpful? How
might we need to further differentiate between such artefacts?
I think that a lot can be gained from literary criticism, even moving in the
direction I mentioned earlier—for example, from the theory of fiction. It is also
always interesting to approach legal texts with instruments from literary criticism.
However, I do not believe that one should hope to solve great theoretical
problems in this manner. That is, I do not believe that we can solve the American
question of originalism by taking recourse to literary criticism and saying, “Here,
we’ve disproven originalism!” A central question is whether that can be done
with such contrasting kinds of texts. And we can also see that literary criticism,
as part of a large historicizing project, is actually interested in the context of
works’ origins. In this sense, they are part of a more broadly conceived
originalist project. In one sense, new historicism is precisely such a more broadly
conceived originalist project. To me, the debate about originalism seems to be
posing the wrong question. There is no way around going back to a text that does
6
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not stem from our present. And we cannot get around treating it as part of the
present. There is no escaping the dilemma, and this dilemma cannot be solved
with one or the other response to it.
Q: In your reflections on the concept of utopia, you differentiate between
aesthetic normativity and social normativity, and how the former has the
privilege of “dwelling in ambiguity.”7 Utopias are distinguished by not
having to restrict themselves to the possible. Such characteristics may come
across as deficient to many, but to what degree might we need particularly
these forms of representation and imagination?
I suspect that works of art, as well as literary works, do not have a hard normative
core, but rather thrive from lacking the immediate urge for realization. Utopias,
on the other hand, have a normative claim in the sense that they strive for
realization. What is conceptually unique about utopias is that, on the one hand,
they bring about this push for realization and, on the other hand, they seem to
suggest the opposite—the impossibility of realizing possibilities. We employ
both utopias and other forms of social norms for coping with our uncertainty
regarding possibilities. We do not know what is possible; we make use of certain
instruments in order to operate with this uncertainty and to try to overcome a
presumed realm of possibilities. But in the case of utopia, it remains conceptually
difficult because there is a contradiction in the relation between realization
impetus—orientation in a certain direction—and claiming that one cannot know
this direction. The utopia seems to get lost at the expense of either the practical
political or the genuine utopian.
Q: Can normativity look backwards? Here, I am thinking of the nostalgia
that feeds into slogans like “make America great again” and the American
fascination with the Founding Fathers and the Constitution. Wherein lies
the danger of looking back?
In my model, norms are always initially future-oriented. I think this is
conceptually necessary. It does not make sense to affirm possibilities if the
possibility has already passed and is in the past. Two options for dealing with
norms should be differentiated from that, though. They are, on the one hand, a
historicizing tendency and, on the other hand, a retrospective tendency that says,
“I’m going to take this norm and see what it means for past conditions.” It seems
sensible to me to combine the two approaches. Retrospection can only be
sensible if one historicizes it and understands the norm as one that lies in the past
but was understood as future-oriented within that same past. For example, the
claim that minorities were discriminated against in early modern Europe is
certainly true, but, at the same time, it is not very descriptive if couched within
unhistorical conceptuality. Such a claim is only interesting when we locate
practices and semantics from the past that correspond to our concepts of
discrimination and minority.
7
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Q: As a legal scholar with great affinity for the literary, do you have any
reflections on Heinrich von Kleist’s Michael Kohlhaas?8
The question about Michael Kohlhaas always leaves me conflicted. I actually
find Kleist’s Der zerbrochne Krug9 to be the more interesting text because it
portrays numerous levels of normative practices with great clarity: the transition
from the pre-modern to the modern, the costs of formalization of legal
procedures, and the fact that the impetus for a process cannot be solved by a legal
procedure. After all, at the end of the Der zerbrochne Krug, when all problems
are solved and all seem content, we realize that the jug is still broken and that this
brokenness cannot be solved through any kind of procedure. The work brings
about a sobering and skillful form that highlights what formalized procedures can
and cannot achieve. In contrast, I cannot really appreciate the moralistic overdetermination of Michael Kohlhaas—just as little as I can empathize with the
character. The whole conflict between justice and order shows, I believe, nothing
that is specifically premodern. The work could just as well stem from the
twentieth century.
Q: Regarding St. Paul, you mention him being of systematic interest for the
book, but you ultimately write quite little about him. How is he a central
figure in thinking about normativity, and how is it difficult to approach him?
Might one claim that certain religious traditions actually serve as good
examples of a more holistic normativity, where normativity is explicitly
articulated in terms of actions, world conditions, and even thought itself?
I begin with St. Paul early on in the book and do not really come back to him—
that is true. That is because my point was a more general one. What particularly
interests me with regard to Christianity is that it is precisely not a reservoir of
moral action imperatives, but rather that it opens up a different access point. It
provides an access point in which one has to free oneself of moral action
imperatives in order to be able to follow the normative program of Christianity.
That means that hard theology of grace—as embodied by St. Augustine and
stemming from St. Paul—for example, is not attached to action, but really
highlights the otherworldliness of the normative. Both themes are central for my
book. Norms are not fixated on action and must be understood as a selfdistancing from social convention. For this reason, I always lament that
Christianity, in particular, is held up as a canon of moral action imperatives.
Q: Coming back to the theme of justification and language, in recent years,
Jürgen Habermas has made a case for a translation proviso for religious
language in official public discourse. Charles Taylor, on the other hand,
insists that such a view of a presumably neutral language is problematic.

8
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From a legal perspective, how do you view a demand for a presumably
neutral language in multiculturally shaped states?
Well, this notion of translation is not convincing to me. I do not really know
what is supposed to be translated into what, nor do I know where the original is
located. It is as if one could magically subtract a rational substratum from any
given religious utterance that can then be reintroduced into discourse. I do not
think that it works that way, and I think it is the same argument we discussed
earlier with regard to linguistic and institutional neutrality. The religious
utterance only exists as such, and if we try to translate it, it is no longer the
religious utterance. Religious dogmas are not monolithic and unchangeable.
Religion can interpret itself anew, but it remains religion and not a translation of
religion. If that were the case, we would be treating religious discourse
differently than we do other discourses in our democracies. We expect of anyone,
whether conservative or socialist, to make themselves comprehensible, but we do
not subject them to any special obligation of translation—even though one could
ponder whether political preferences are any more rationale than religious
convictions. Not only have we had horrible experiences with numerous such
ideologies in politics, but also the crux of the matter with democratic politics is
that, initially, we introduce all kinds of incommensurable, untranslated
viewpoints into the process. Whether that works or not is another question, and it
works precisely when others can “do something with it.” Whether this “doing
something with it” can be seen as comprehension in a strong Habermasian sense
is doubtful itself. It could also be misunderstanding or miscomprehension. Even
misapprehension can lead to the formation of coalitions and democratic decisionmaking. That might even be the case more often than not. That is why this whole
notion that we can reduce the political process to a rational substratum, and the
special treatment of some discourses over and against other discourses and
irrationalisms in democratic discourse—in this context, the particularly bad
mistreatment of religion—is not justified.
Q: One final thought comes to mind in terms of expanding examples of
normativity. What about normativity in sports? Is it comparable to
language?
I am particularly interested in soccer, because you can observe how people try to
unify different rule cultures. During the European Championships, you can see
how referees from different sports cultures lay the rules out slightly differently.
Of course, there are attempts to make them more uniform, but it does not always
work. And what is funny is that we come to accept this as both teams are treated
in the same manner—a manner that is still located within regulations, even
though it might have nothing to do with how the rules were initially meant to be.
This is all very interesting, and it could become part of an empirical research
project that looks much more closely at rules conventions and describes just what
is going on there.

